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Moral rules are an important aspect of culture. Yet, to date no published scale exists to 
measure the endorsement of different moral codes. We report the development of the CADS 
(Community, Autonomy and Divinity Scale), based on Shweder’s (2003a) moral codes, as a 
means to measure cross-cultural, sub-cultural, and individual differences in the contents of 
morality. Scale development, confirmatory factor analysis, convergent and discriminant 
validity are reported in Studies 1 and 2, as well as analysis for structural invariance and 
meaningful differences across British and Brazilian cultural contexts. We find the CADS to 
be a reliable and valid scale, thereby enabling the cross-cultural quantitative study of 
similarities and differences in endorsement of moral codes. 
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The Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Scale (CADS) 
A new tool for the cross-cultural study of morality 
 
Morality has been considered as an important aspect of culture (Narvaez, Getz, Rest & 
Thoma, 1999). Although the existence of moral systems is universal, research findings have 
demonstrated important differences in the use of morality-based arguments across cultures 
(Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Rozin, Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999). This research addresses a 
lack in the literature by systematically developing a theory-based questionnaire measuring 
endorsement of moral codes that can be used to study cultural and individual differences. 
Morality and culture 
 Does moral judgment follow universal or culture-specific rules?  According to Gert 
(1988), philosophers have not traditionally been interested in cultural differences in morality. 
Plato (1984) and Kant (1789/1965), for example, while aware of the variation of moral 
conduct in different societies, nonetheless proposed universal theories associating ethics with 
virtue and rationality. Research on morality in psychology has primarily dealt with the 
development of morality and the process of reasoning and moral judgment (see Miller, 2001). 
Universalists, such as Piaget (1977) and Kohlberg (1981, 1984), propose a single legitimate 
moral domain consisting of concerns with justice, rights and protection from harm (Bhatia, 
2000; Miller, 2001); a domain that can be found in all cultures, and whose development 
follows the same sequence in all cultures (Kohlberg, 1981; Piaget, 1977). Relativists, 
however, propose that this rights-based code, while emphasized in Western cultures, does not 
account for the whole moral domain (Chiu, Dweck, Tong & Fu, 1997; Shweder, Much, 
Mahapatra & Park, 1997). They suggest that moral norms are relative to the culture they are 
part of (Harman, 1975; Shweder, 1990a). Such approaches recognize the possibility of moral 
universals, but do not confine the moral domain to these. Instead, they emphasize the cultural 
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nature of moral beliefs that are not so extensively studied, such as duty, interpersonal 
relationships, and religious norms (Darley & Shultz, 1990; Miller, 2001). 
 Several studies have shown that such cultural values predict moral reasoning and 
judgment (Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Narvaez, et al., 1999). Shah (2004), for example, suggests 
that religiosity strongly influences the moral behavior of teenagers. Religious practices and 
beliefs are culturally defined (Tarakeshwar, Stanton & Pargament, 2003), and universalist 
approaches have largely ignored religion’s role in morality. However, for some people, 
morality may be entirely related to personal religious beliefs (Miller, 2001). 
Shweder (2003b) also proposed that different cultures value different moral goods. 
Using ethnographic methods, Shweder found moral judgment in Indian culture to depend on 
strict social rules to be universally applied, based on community duties and, sometimes, on 
religious rules. However, in the United States, participants showed a greater liberality in 
social rules, endorsing instead a morality based on individual rights (Shweder et al., 1997). 
This work led to a three-category taxonomy, a “Big Three” of morality. These three ethics, as 
proposed by Shweder (1990a; Shweder et al., 1997), can coexist in the same culture, but with 
varying degrees of emphasis. 
Ethics of autonomy. This code defines the individual as the source of moral authority. 
The autonomy moral system is based on people’s rights to pursue their needs and desires, and 
on fairness and justice (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). Shweder (2003a) suggests that in 
autonomy ethics, the individual is seen as “a preference structure, [where] obligations come 
from being a person” (p. 98). Key moral concepts are equality of rights between individuals, 
independence, freedom of choice and personal well-being (Jensen, 2004). 
Ethics of community. This morality is based on loyalty, duty, honor, respect, self-
control, obedience to authority, and actions consistent with one’s social roles. People are 
defined as having social roles in families, nations, or other social groups that are part of their 
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identity, and interpersonal responsibilities are a moral duty (Miller, 2001; Shweder, 2003a). 
The basis of moral beliefs is one’s role in a social group (Arnett, Ramos & Jensen, 2001).  
Ethics of divinity. The ethics of divinity describe a person as a spiritual entity subject 
to a higher order (Shweder, 2003a). It connects the self to a higher force, and the body is 
sacred, making it important to maintain purity (Haidt, et al., 1993). Divinity does not require 
any particular religious outlook. Its central values are anchored in the concept of divine or 
natural law, often based on religious authorities and texts (e.g., the Bible), as well as on 
obligations, punishments, and rewards with respect to supernatural forces (Arnett et al., 2001; 
Jensen, 1995). The concepts for the ethics of divinity were developed from the study of two 
different religious traditions: monotheistic (Christian, in the U.S.), and polytheistic (Hindu, in 
India), with most core concepts shared by both types of tradition. 
 A number of studies have looked at the use of these codes in Brazil, India, Japan, the 
Philippines, and the U.S. (Jensen, 1995; Rozin et al., 1999; Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & 
Banaszynski, 2001). Haidt et al. (1993) found differences in endorsement of ethics as a 
function of both nation and social class when studying adults and children in Brazil and the 
U.S. University students in both countries used the ethics of autonomy more often than the 
other two ethics. Among the non-university population, Americans used ethics of autonomy 
more than Brazilians, whereas the latter presented arguments mainly based on both autonomy 
and community. Similar results were found by Vasquez et al (2001) with samples from the 
U.S, where participants presented moral judgments based on autonomy, and the Philippines, 
where all three ethics were used. Jensen (1995), studying adults in the U.S., suggests that the 
language of autonomy is common among middle-class young adults; midlife and older adults, 
on the other hand, balanced the importance of autonomy values with concerns for the 
demands of the community, nature, and God. These findings show that the moral codes can 
also identify differences between subcultures, such as different generations or social classes. 
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Socio-historical processes in place in specific contexts may be responsible for this 
variation in ethics within each culture, as they can convert preferences into values at the 
individual and cultural levels (Miller, 2001). For example, to explain the reliance on 
autonomy ethics among liberal sectors, Rozin (1999) suggests that the decline of divinity 
concerns in modern Western cultures may have granted a greater importance to rights and 
protection from harm, for which the moral authority is the ideal of justice. Individual moral 
orientations (Forsyth, 1980; Forsyth & Berger, 1982) can help predict moral judgments; 
however, culture also has an important role. The variation is not only in individual 
orientations, but in background principles emphasized by each culture (Miller, 2001). 
The majority of studies in this tradition have used ethnographic and free coding 
methods, rather than a standardized measure of endorsement of the moral codes. The 
development of a standardized measure will make the exploration of this field easier for 
researchers, and allow findings to be associated with other constructs. In particular, 
developing a standard instrument allows researchers to take the novel approach of viewing 
variations in moral code endorsement as an individual as well as a cultural difference. 
This paper presents two studies that develop, validate, and test a quantitative measure 
of the Big Three moral codes: the Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Scale (CADS). Two 
nations (United Kingdom and Brazil) were selected as examples of collectivist and 
individualist cultures (Brazil IC Rating = 3.90, indicating collectivism; UK IC Rating = 8.95, 
indicating individualism; Fernández, Páez, & González, 2005), while having similarities in 
other respects (e.g., both are Western cultures and subscribe to Judeo-Christian traditions). 
Additionally, Brazilian culture tends to be more religious than European countries (Gouveia 
& Clemente, 2000), whereas Britain presents a low religiosity (Voas & Crockett, 2005). 
Study 1 was conducted in Britain with a pilot version of the scale, and data reduction 
analyses were used to compose its final version. Study 2 was designed to examine the 
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psychometric properties of the CADS, as well as to validate the CADS in Portuguese for a 
Brazilian sample, checking whether the structure of the measure remained similar across 
populations, and at the same time reflected cultural differences in mean moral code 
endorsement. Based on theory and previous findings, we generated two types of hypotheses: 
cultural hypotheses (e.g., C1, C2), covering characteristics of specific cultures and subgroups, 
and differences between them; and structural hypotheses (e.g., S1, S2), covering the structure 
of relationships among the moral codes and other measures that should hold across cultures. 
These hypotheses were tested only in the UK in Study 1, but in both countries in Study 2. 
Study 1 
Study 1 tested an initial version of the CADS, selecting the best items to compose the 
final scale, and testing the resulting scale for convergent and discriminant validity toward 
other constructs. Although the titles “autonomy” and “community” might suggest a one-to-
one mapping to individualism and collectivism, conceptually these ethics are more strongly 
related to the horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism/collectivism. In fact, the 
core concepts of the autonomy code emphasize values central to the horizontal attributes of 
both individualism and collectivism. Triandis and Gelfand (1998) suggest that horizontality 
emphasizes equality, while verticality emphasizes hierarchical systems. Therefore, vertical 
individualism is not expected to relate to autonomy, due to its emphasis on hierarchy (e.g., a 
hierarchy of individual ability), but horizontal individualism and horizontal collectivism 
would both be related to autonomy (hypothesis S1), because each can underlie concern for 
equality and the rights of others (Schwartz, 2007). Another clear conceptual mapping 
connects divinity and community to vertical collectivism (hypothesis S2), as both ethics rely 
on hierarchy and duty – be it to family, group leaders or God.  
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Based on previous findings associating religiosity with endorsement of the divinity 
moral code (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Jensen, 1998), we expected a positive association between 
intrinsic religiosity orientation and divinity ethics (hypothesis S3). 
In correlations among the three codes, Haidt et al. (1993) suggest an association 
between divinity and community; both support a hierarchical system and conservative social 
norms, while families and communities often share religious beliefs. Therefore, hypothesis S4 
predicts a positive correlation between the ethics of community and divinity. 
In specific cultural predictions, British students should present high scores in 
horizontality and individualism (hypothesis C1). Although the UK has high individualism 
(Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998), Schwartz and Ros (1995) show that Western 
European countries follow values such as egalitarianism and harmony more than hierarchy 
and achievement. Therefore British individualism might be more horizontal than vertical. 
The literature offers contradictory findings about gender differences in ethics. Some 
researchers have suggested that women consider interpersonal context more than men in 
moral judgment (Gilligan, 1982; Ford & Lowery, 1986). Therefore, women may score higher 
than men in divinity and community ethics (hypothesis C2). However, this hypothesis is only 
tentative. Other researchers have concluded there are no meaningful gender differences in 
moral judgment (for a review, see Jaffee & Hyde, 2000); also, concern for interpersonal 
context may not translate into a more divinity- or community-oriented view, as such concern 
can also arise under autonomy ethics (e.g., balancing different people’s rights). 
Finally, as suggested by research on Western cultures (e.g., Haidt et al., 1993), British 




 Data were collected with 275 British-born students (65% women) from a large British 
university, who participated in exchange for partial course credit or £3 (three pounds). 
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 42 with a mean of 20.3 (SD=2.85). The majority of the 
participants did not have religious beliefs (52%); those who did were mainly Catholics (25%). 
Measures 
 A pool of 107 items was generated to represent the three ethics (Shweder et al., 1997), 
based on the coding manual developed by Jensen (2004), to categorize participants’ moral 
justifications in interviews. These categories emerged from participants’ freely given answers, 
showing the existence of the ethics in everyday moral discourse. Previous studies of these 
ethics have focused on how they are used to judge actions as morally wrong. We decided, 
however, to introduce a novel approach by also measuring how ethics relate to approval of 
moral actions as right. While social psychology tends to focus on pro-social acts, undoing 
harm or affirming rights, as a primary example of positive moral behavior (e.g., Penner, 
Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005), it has not looked as much at actions that support 
community or divinity ethics, such as fulfilling duties or respecting sacred boundaries. 
 Our initial goal was to reduce this first pool of items to create a parsimonious and 
internally valid instrument. The items were presented to 15 judges, who read definitions of the 
ethics, then were asked to read each phrase and to categorize it into one of the three ethics. 
Only the 82 items that reached 70% agreement among all judges were included in the 
questionnaire presented to the participants in Study 1: 26 for autonomy, 28 for community, 
and 28 for divinity. All items were presented on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Not 
important at all) to 7 (Of the utmost importance), and were preceded by these instructions: 
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The following sentences express standards that different people may have 
when judging something as morally right or morally wrong. When YOU are 
judging something as RIGHT / WRONG, to what extent is each of the 
following standards important to your judgment? 
 The other scales included to verify their relation to the CADS were analyzed as 
individual-level variables, as suggested by Van de Vijver and Leung (1997) when only a 
small number of cultures is available for analysis. They were: 
 Individualism-Collectivism. This scale measures the horizontal and vertical 
dimensions of individualism – collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). This 16-item measure 
uses 7-point scales, ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree. Cronbach’s 
alpha were acceptable in the UK (Horizontal Individualism-HI α = .60; Vertical 
Individualism-VI α = .69; Horizontal Collectivism-HC α = .61; and Vertical Collectivism-VC 
α = .68). 
 Intrinsic Religiosity. This scale comprised the nine items measuring intrinsic 
religiosity in the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967). It uses 5-point scales 
from 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree (Cronbach’s α = .93). The intrinsic 
religiosity scale is usually presented with the extrinsic scale (Allport & Ross, 1967). However 
we decided to include only the intrinsic scale as it represents personal religiosity, which is 
more related conceptually to divinity ethics, rather than participation in religious practices due 
to external reasons, which is less of a moral than a social choice. 
 Finally, participants provided their sex, age, nationality and religion, and answered a 
five-point scale measuring general religiosity/spirituality, where 1 meant “no religiosity/ 
spirituality” and 5, “strong religiosity/spirituality” (Inglehart, Basanez, & Moreno, 1998). 
Results and Discussion 
Item Analysis and Exploratory Factor Analysis 
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 Each item that did not correlate with any other item or with its proposed subscale at r 
= +/-.40 or more was discarded, excluding 11 in total. The remaining 71 items were submitted 
to separate maximum likelihood factor analysis using an orthogonal (Varimax) rotation. To be 
retained, an item had to present a factor loading equal to or higher than +/-.45 in only one 
factor; any items presenting factor loadings higher than +/-.40 in more than one factor, or in 
no factors, were discarded. These limits were chosen in order to include only strong items in 
each factor. The χ2 index of the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was 14,490.93 (p < .001), 
indicating the matrix was suitable for factor analysis. 
From the set of 71 items, 59 presented acceptable factor loadings in the expected 
categories. The initial solution presented five factors with eigenvalues higher than 1. 
However, a scree plot analysis (Cattel, 1966) suggested three main factors to be retained. The 
first factor (21 items) expressed divinity, with factor loadings from .85 to .49. This dimension 
presented an eigenvalue of 12.85, explaining 18% of the variance (Cronbach’s α = .96). The 
second factor (19 items) expressed community ethics, with factor loadings from .75 to .49, an 
eigenvalue of 10.03, and 14% of explained variance (Cronbach’s α = .94). The third factor 
(19 items) expressed autonomy ethics, with factor loadings from .75 to .46. It explained 
10.20% of the variance, with an eigenvalue of 7.24 (Cronbach’s α = .89). The three main 
factors explained altogether 42.4% of the variance. 
Structural hypotheses 
Correlations among the CADS dimensions and the other constructs were next 
examined (Table 1). Among the dimensions, divinity and community had the strongest 
correlation, corroborating hypothesis S4. Community also had a positive correlation with 
autonomy. These two correlations were significantly different from each other, t (272) = 2.25, 
p < .05. Autonomy and divinity were not correlated, and this lack of association was also 
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significantly different from the correlation between community and autonomy, t (272) = 3.53, 
p < .01, and between community and divinity, t (272) = 5.83, p < .01. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 around here 
-------------------------------- 
Horizontal individualism correlated only with autonomy, while vertical individualism 
did not correlate with any of the CADS dimensions. Horizontal collectivism was positively 
associated with all dimensions, but most strongly with community as opposed to divinity, t 
(272) = 4.27, p < .01, and autonomy, t (272) = 2.53, p < .05. Vertical collectivism had near-
identical correlations with divinity and community. This supports hypotheses S1 and S2. 
Both religiosity variables correlated only with divinity, supporting hypothesis S3. 
Cultural hypotheses 
British students were expected to score highly on the horizontal and individualist 
dimensions (hypothesis C1). In a 2 (Dimension: individualism-collectivism) x 2 (Attribute: 
horizontal-vertical) repeated measures analysis of variance there was a main effect of 
dimension, F (1, 274) = 118.47, η2 = 30, p < .001, with individualism generally higher than 
collectivism; a main effect of attribute, F (1, 274) = 257.18, η2 = .48, p < .001, with the 
horizontal dimension higher than the vertical; and a significant interaction, F (1, 274) = 
107.52, η2 = .28, p < .001, where participants endorsed horizontal individualism (M = 5.44),  
vertical individualism (M = 5.03) and horizontal collectivism (M = 5.21) highly, but not 
vertical collectivism (M = 3.98). These results support the proposed hypothesis (C1). 
 A 2 (Gender) x 3 (Ethics) mixed analysis tested overall differences and gender 
differences in endorsement of specific ethics (hypotheses C3 and C2 respectively). A main 
effect of ethics was found, F (2, 544) = 218.34, η2 = .45, p < .001, with the ethics of 
autonomy endorsed most highly, as expected in a Western culture, while divinity had the 
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lowest mean, and community fell between divinity and autonomy, supporting hypothesis C3. 
Gender also had a significant main effect, F (1, 272) = 25.38, η2 = .09, p < .001, suggesting 
an overall stronger endorsement of morality items among women. However, there was no 
significant interaction, so hypothesis C2 was not confirmed.  
Study 2 
 Study 2 investigated the test-retest reliability of the CADS among the British sample. 
It also aimed at testing it for multigroup invariance through confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA), and examining cultural differences between a British and a Brazilian population. 
 We expected the results of hypotheses C1 through C3, and hypotheses S1 through S4, 
from Study 1 to be replicated in Study 2, which also introduced a number of new hypotheses.  
The British culture nowadays is known for its secularity (e.g. Voas & Crockett, 2005). 
However, Hatch, Burg, Naberhaus, and Hellmich (1998) suggest that spirituality is a broader 
dimension than religiosity. Individuals can be spiritual (e.g. having mystical experiences) and 
not religious (e.g. taking part in religious rituals). Although we have already seen that British 
individuals were low in adherence to religion, it is possible that they consider themselves 
more spiritual than religious (hypothesis C4), and that spiritual beliefs correlate with 
endorsement of divinity ethics (hypothesis S5). Due to space constraints in the Brazilian 
version of the questionnaire, the items on spiritual beliefs could be included only in Britain. 
 The association between religiosity and morality is highly important, in comparing 
Brazilian and British culture. Out of the total Brazilian population, 75% are Catholic (IBGE, 
2001). Previous research (Gouveia & Clemente, 2000) has shown a high level of religiosity, 
even when the sample was formed by university students. Therefore, we can expect that 
religiosity and divinity would be more highly endorsed among participants in Brazil than in 
Britain (hypothesis C5). Overall, we expected that the CADS’ structure and relationships to 




British participants were 142 university students; recruitment and incentive were the 
same as in Study 1. Participants were informed that they would be asked to return after four 
weeks to complete a retest, with a total of 138 returning participants (97%). Sixty-two percent 
were women, and the mean age was 20.3 (SD = 2.85). British nationals were 68% of the 
sample, and 47% belonged to a religious denomination, with a Catholic plurality (18%). 
 Brazilian participants were 288 undergraduates (56% women) from two universities in 
the Northeast of Brazil, with a mean age of 25.8 (SD=8.48). Catholics formed 54% of the 
sample. The students participated on a voluntary basis. 
Measures 
 CADS. The final scale consisted of 59 items (21 on divinity, 20 on community, and 18 
on autonomy). To validate the CADS for the Brazilian context, a back-translation approach 
was used by two bilingual psychologists. The items were presented to a group of first-year 
university students to test for difficulty in comprehension, and revised accordingly. 
 Horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. Also used in Study 1, 
Cronbach’s alphas in the British and Brazilian samples were, respectively: HI = .62 and .63; 
VI = .71 and .62; HC = .71 and .60; VC = .67 and .65. Although most of these indices are 
below the .70 cut-off criteria, they can be considered acceptable (Garson, 2008) and they are 
consistently similar to values found in previous research (Gouveia, Andrade, Jesus, Meira & 
Soares, 2002; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). 
 Intrinsic Religiosity. Also used in Study 1, the Intrinsic Religiosity Scale had 
Cronbach’s alpha of .91 for the British sample and .90 for the Brazilian sample. 
Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale. Developed by Hatch et al, (1998), this scale 
assesses spiritual beliefs without referring to a specific religion. It consists of 23 items (e.g.: 
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My life has a purpose; I have a personal relationship with a power greater than myself) 
answered on a five-point scale, from Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (5). It presented 
an internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) of .85 in the British sample.   
Socio-demographic questions. Age, gender, religion, country of origin and years living 
in own country were assessed, as well as the general religiosity item from Study 1.  
For British participants, the two sessions were separated by four weeks. Brazilian 
participants answered the questionnaires in only one session in a classroom environment. 
Results and Discussion 
Test-Retest Reliability 
 Generally, the correlations indicated acceptable test-retest reliability. Divinity score in 
Time 1 (T1) correlated at .87, p < .001 with Divinity in Time 2 (T2); Community in T1 
correlated at .73, p < .001, with the same score in T2, while Autonomy (T1) correlated at .60, 
p < .001, in T2. Although one of the test–retest correlations is below the proposed value of 
0.70 or above (Anastasi & Urbina, 2000), it is important to consider that the longer the 
interval between the first and second administration of the scale, the lower this index will be. 
A four-week period was chosen due to the fact that two weeks may be short to prevent the 
participants from remembering the answers, inflating reliability values (Anastasi & Urbina, 
2000). The instrument, consequently, can be considered reliable over time. The three 
proposed factors also presented satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha: .93 (T1) and .92 (T2) for 
Community; .86 (T1) and .85 (T2) for Autonomy; and .94 (T1) and .95 (T2) for Divinity. 
 Each scale’s scores were submitted to a paired-sample t test to verify if there was a 
significant difference in their means after the four-week interval. No significant difference 
was found for any of the factors. Overall there was a stronger endorsement of the Autonomy 
factor (T1 M = 5.23, SD = .78; T2 M = 5.33, SD = .75) when compared to Community (T1 M 
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= 4.32, SD = .94; T2 M = 4.28, SD = .97) and Divinity (T1 M = 3.41, SD = 1.32; T2 M = 3.32, 
SD = 1.29), replicating Study 1 findings and corroborating hypothesis S7. 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) 
 To confirm the structure of the CADS in the UK and Brazil, all items were submitted 
to a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS Software, version 7. For this and 
all subsequent analyses, the British sample was reduced to include only British-born 
participants (N = 97), allowing comparison between natives of both countries. Before 
conducting the analysis, however, CADS items were centered in each sample to control for 
acquiescence and extremity bias (Fischer, 2004; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997), with further 
analyses conducted with the standardized scores. 
The three-factor model suggested by Study 1’s exploratory factor analysis was the first 
to be tested. Sixteen items (3 community, 10 autonomy, and 3 divinity items) were dropped 
due to non significant loadings in both samples, and/or significant loadings in a different 
dimension; after these items were dropped, the final scale formed by 43 items was tested 
again. Model 1 results (Table 2) show the goodness-of-fit indices for the final scale analysis 
and suggests the original three-factor first order structure is not suitable for this data. 
An examination of modification indices and residual matrix suggested stronger 
associations between five items in the divinity dimension, such as 03 (It follows nature’s law), 
and 39 (It is unnatural). In terms of item content, these items used the idea of ‘obedience to 
laws of nature’ as a means of justification for moral judgment. The same was observed for 
five items in the community dimension, such as 13 (It respects family traditions), and 45 (The 
family considers it unacceptable), which emphasized the importance of family’s rules and 
beliefs. For autonomy, stronger associations were suggested for the five positive (e.g., It 
expresses someone’s autonomy), and the five negative items (e.g., It restricts the individual’s 
rights), also creating two groups. 
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Based on these residuals, Models 2, 3, and 4 were developed. Model 2 proposes two 
sub-factors for divinity (first, nature, and second, other items) and two sub-factors for 
community (first, family, and second, other items), with autonomy remaining as a single 
factor. Model 3 adds to Model 2, proposing two sub-factors for autonomy positive and 
negative items. And finally, Model 4 tested the hypothesis that the subdivision in the factors 
was due to item wording, separating the community and divinity dimensions on the basis of 
right and wrong items in addition to family or nature items. Table 2 gives these model tests. 
 Dividing the dimensions into six subscales improved the model significantly, as 
suggested by the ∆χ2 results. The model presenting eight sub-factors based on the right/wrong 
items had lower goodness of fit, showing that the division between positive and negative 
items was confined to Autonomy. In Model 5, fit was not greatly reduced by adding three 
extra latent variables representing the original three higher order factors predicting the six 
first-order factors found in Model 3. We included three extra latent variables, predicting 
directly the six latent factors found in Model 3, and indirectly the items. Although in general 
CFI and NNFI values were lower than ideal, they can still be considered an acceptable fit to 
the data (Byrne, 2004). 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 around here 
-------------------------------- 
 This analysis confirmed the “big three” structure of the CADS while indicating the 
existence of important subscales in our instrument. Community is divided into Family, with 
items emphasizing the importance of the family group as an authority in the moral domain; 
and Social Rules, which accords moral authority to the society as a whole, with its rules, laws 
and sanctions. Cronbach’s alphas were recalculated with the centered data for each sub-scale, 
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and for the British and Brazilian samples, they were respectively .90 and .79, for social rules 
and .87 and .70 for family (.91 and .83 for the full Community scale). 
Divinity is divided into Nature, highlighting the importance of the laws of nature and 
an ideal of purity associated with moral character; and Religious rules, involving respect for 
religious tradition and authority when justifying right/wrong actions. In the British and 
Brazilian samples, Cronbach’s alpha for religious rules were, respectively, .95 and .90; .88 
and .77 for nature (.94 and .89 for the full Divinity scale). 
The Autonomy dimension showed a distinction between positive and negative rights. 
Positive rights presented Cronbach’s alphas of .72 (British) and .78 (Brazilian), and Negative 
rights indices were .83 (British) and .88 (Brazilian), with full Autonomy scale indices of .86 
(British) and .84 (Brazilian). Although the items in both sub-dimensions seem to present a 
similar content, the actions that are justified by these standards are different. Right and wrong, 
in this case, might not be a bipolar dimension. Gewirth (2001) defines positive rights as the 
ones that “entail positive duties, i.e., duties to [respect and] help persons to have the objects of 
their rights” (p. 322). An example could be found in the following item: “expressing 
someone’s autonomy” is in accordance with positive rights, as well as acts that help other 
persons to express their autonomy, such as laws that defend freedom of speech. Negative 
rights “entail negative duties, i.e., duties to forbear or refrain from interfering with persons’ 
having the objects of their rights” (p. 322). Laws or norms emphasizing that no one can 
restrict someone else’s autonomy is an example of a negative right. An action that is not 
“morally wrong” is not necessarily right; one person might be more concerned with positive 
promotion of rights than negative restriction of rights, while another might take the opposite 
view. The differentiation of positive and negative rights in the autonomy dimension indicates 
more complexity in this moral code.  
Measurement invariance 
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 Results regarding the measurement equivalence for the British and Brazilian samples 
are presented in Table 3. According to Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998), the two forms of 
invariance that must be established are configural invariance (similar factor structures in two 
groups) and metric invariance (similar factor loadings across groups). However, to compare 
countries on a mean level, full or partial scalar invariance should also be tested (Byrne, 2004; 
Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). All three scales were tested for configural equivalence, 
and results were used as the baseline model for subsequent analyses. After metric invariance 
(constraining factor loadings across groups) was obtained, scalar invariance (constraining 
intercepts across groups) was tested (see review in Lucas et al., 2008).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 around here 
-------------------------------- 
Results for the autonomy dimension suggested its invariance across cultures. 
However, community and divinity dimensions cannot be considered fully invariant. 
According to Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998), and Byrne (2004), further tests of partial 
invariance can be conducted by constraining the intercepts of each item individually to 
identify non-invariant items. After this identification, these items may be removed or 
unconstrained (see Cheung & Rensvold, 2000). Scalar invariance has to be found for at least 
one item, besides the marker item in each factor for possible cross-national comparisons 
(Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). After conducting these analyses for each dimension, in 
the community scale, from a total of 15 items, four were considered non-invariant and 
unconstrained in further analysis, all belonging to social rules (17. It follows the rules of one’s 
social group; 27. It brings disorder to society; 33. Society considers it unacceptable; and 34. 
It opposes the rules of society.). Partial invariance was obtained, with a non-significant 
difference found between the partially constrained and the configural models. Similar 
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analyses were performed divinity, with only one non-invariant item belonging to religious 
rules, found in a total of 18 (37. It pollutes the spirit). General findings suggest the 
acceptability of the measure for cross-cultural research. 
Structural hypotheses 
Once the final set of items was established, mean averages were calculated for British 
(N = 97) and Brazilian participants (N = 288).These scores were used to test the theoretical 
hypotheses proposed, aiming at corroborating Study 1 results.  
Initially, correlations among the sub-factors showed strong associations between both 
sub-factors in each dimension. For both British and Brazilian samples, respectively, social 
rules presented the highest correlation with family (r = .57, p < .01 and r = .52, p <.01); 
positive rights, with negative rights (r = .70, p < .01 and r = .52, p <.01); and religious rules, 
with nature (r = .47, p < .01 and r = .31, p <.01). Social rules also correlated with religious 
rules (r = .16, p < .05 and r = .19, p <.05) and nature (r = .41, p < .01 and r = .26, p <.01) in 
both countries. In Brazil, social rules also correlated with positive rights (r = .19, p <.05) and 
negative rights (r = .23, p <.01). Family correlated with religious rules (r = .29, p < .01 and r 
= .32, p <.01) and nature (r = .29, p < .01 and r = .26, p <.01) in both countries, and with 
negative rights (r = .18, p < .05) in Brazil only, partially confirming hypothesis S4, which 
suggested the direct association between divinity and community. In Brazil, positive rights 
correlated with religious rules (r = -.16, p < .05), and negative rights with nature (r = .28, p < 
.01). Associations to other constructs are presented in Table 4. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 around here 
-------------------------------- 
Hypothesis S1 suggested a direct association between horizontal individualism-
collectivism and autonomy, and results partially corroborated this hypothesis. In the UK, only 
 21
horizontal individualism was associated with autonomy and its subscales, whereas in Brazil 
both horizontal individualism and collectivism presented this association. Hypothesis S2, 
suggesting associations between divinity, community, and vertical collectivism, was 
corroborated for both countries.  
These findings suggest an interesting pattern of association between the moral codes 
and individualism-collectivism. As Triandis and Gelfand (1998) and Schwartz and Ros (1995) 
propose, the distinction between individualist and collectivist cultures is not sufficient to 
describe a country’s cultural characteristics. The horizontal and vertical attributes suggest an 
essential difference in the way people in these countries value their moral judgments: 
emphasizing equality or being part of a hierarchical system (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). 
Hypothesis S3 suggested the association between intrinsic religiosity and divinity, 
which was also corroborated. In the UK, a fifth structural hypothesis was tested, suggesting 
the relationship between spirituality and divinity. Corroborating the proposed association, 
spiritual beliefs presented direct correlations to both religious rules and nature subscales. 
Cultural hypotheses 
The differentiated association of autonomy with horizontal individualism in the UK, 
and horizontal collectivism in Brazil, could be an expression of the more collectivist tendency 
of the Brazilian culture (Gouveia & Clemente, 2000). To test for this tendency and for 
hypothesis C1 that higher scores would be found for horizontality and individualism, a 2 
(Dimensions: individualism-collectivism) x 2 (Attributes: horizontal-vertical) x 2 (Country: 
UK-Brazil) mixed analysis was conducted. There was a main effect of dimension, F (1, 366) 
= 161.45, η2 = .31, p < .001, with individualism scores higher than collectivism across 
countries. A main effect of attribute was found, F (1, 366) = 406.88, η2 = .53, p < .001, with a 
higher endorsement of horizontality in general, corroborating the proposed hypothesis. 
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Of greater importance, a significant three-way interaction was found between 
dimension (Ind-Col), attribute (Horiz-Vert) and country, F (1, 366) = 10.48, η2 = .04, p < .01, 
with Brazil presenting higher scores in horizontal collectivism (M = 5.85, SD = .61) than the 
UK (M = 5.40, SD = .67), F (1, 367) = 23.17, p < .001; and marginally higher scores in 
vertical collectivism (Brazil M = 5.17, SD = .76; UK M = 4.98, SD = .96), F (1, 367) = 2.95, p 
= .09. A main effect of country on individualism scores was not found. 
Another mixed analysis, 2 (country, between) x 2 (gender, between) x 6 (ethics, 
within) was conducted to test for overall differences in ethics endorsement and possible 
moderation of these differences by gender and country. Unlike Study 1, a significant main 
effect of gender was not found, F (1, 286) = 1.527, p = .22, nor was any interaction found that 
involved gender. These results are in accordance with a growing amount of research 
suggesting a lack of association between morality and gender (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). 
A main effect of ethics was found, F (5, 1430) = 3.65, η2 = 02, p < .001, with 
Autonomy subscales presenting the highest endorsement overall. A similar pattern to Study 1 
was found, with Divinity subscales presenting the lowest means and Community subscales in 
between the other dimensions, replicating previous results and corroborating hypothesis C3. 
A main effect of country was not found, but an Ethics x Country interaction was observed, F 
(5, 1430) = 5.96, η2 = 02, p < .01. Brazilians presented a higher endorsement of religious 
rules, F (1, 289) = 4.81, p <.05, in comparison to British, corroborating hypothesis C5. 
For our measures of religiosity, analysis of variance showed that Brazilian participants 
presented a higher religiosity on the single item (BR: M = 3.04, SD = 1.25; UK: M = 2.20, SD 
= 1.26), F (1, 365) = 16.62, p < .001, and on the intrinsic religiosity scale (BR: M = 3.25, SD 
= .91; UK: M = 2.03, SD = .92) than British participants, F (1, 365) = 100.16, p < .001, 
replicating previous findings (Gouveia & Clemente, 2000). 
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To test hypothesis C4 regarding differences in religiosity and spirituality in the UK, a 
repeated measures analysis was conducted, with the intrinsic religiosity scale and the spiritual 
beliefs scale entered as within-subject variables. Results shown a main effect of scale on the 
scores, F (1, 95) = 50.52, η2 = .35, p < .01, with higher means found for the spiritual beliefs 
scale (M = 3.17) in comparison with intrinsic religiosity (M = 2.03). 
Overall, the results of the second study have confirmed our hypotheses. In general, 
these results are consistent with predictions made by the literature, in terms of the core ideas 
and judgment pertaining to each moral code (Shweder, 1990b; Shweder et al., 1997). 
General Discussion 
The main objective of the present research was to develop a measure of endorsement 
of different moral codes that can be used to study differences between cultures and 
individuals. In general, the results have confirmed the meaningful structure, validity, and 
consistency of our scale, supporting Shweder’s proposal. 
It is also important, however, to discuss possible limitations of this work. Our 
participants were exclusively university students from urban areas, and samples were not 
representative of each country. Specific findings could be a result of the university 
environment and also an age effect, especially if considering that 91.5% of the sample 
consisted of people from 18 to 24 years old. University students might also be considered 
more similar than different in terms of moral discourse, not clearly reflecting their national 
culture. A similarity between university samples when compared to non-university samples 
was also found by Haidt and colleagues (1993) in terms of the use of the three ethics. 
Another important limitation to discuss is the use of a morality scale developed in two 
Christian cultures. Although they are different cultural contexts, they also present similarities 
due to shared values. Therefore, the adequacy of the proposed scale for use in non-Christian 
cultures has to be evaluated by the researcher in terms of construct and cultural biases (Van de 
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Vijver & Leung, 1997). Due to the lack of full scalar invariance in multigroup comparisons 
for community and divinity dimensions, alternative explanations for the results are needed, 
such as differences in the meaning of the items in both cultures. However, it is important to 
emphasize that full score invariance is not usually found; partial measurement equivalence 
allow us to compare correlations, explain variances and patterns of scores across cultures, as 
well as average scores, but with caution (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). 
Although it is important to validate a scale against existing morality instruments, the 
use of the chosen measures was due to the main interest of associating the moral codes with 
cultural orientations (individualism-collectivism) and cultural values (such as religious 
beliefs). CADS items were developed strictly based on free moral discourse registered by 
Shweder and colleagues (1987, 1997) and Jensen (2004) in ethnographic studies. This 
discourse might not express the levels of moral reasoning of these cultures, but it does express 
specific contents used with moral force in judgements of actions. 
In comparisons across cultures, the more religious nature of Brazilian culture was 
reflected in differences between the samples on religious rules, while British participants, 
though overall lower in ethics of divinity, used concepts of nature to express their divinity 
concerns. 
The development of this instrument can bring numerous benefits to the study of 
morality. A quantitative measure helps in collecting data and can be translated into different 
cultures. Also, this instrument attempts to measure not only morally “wrong” standards, but 
also covers morally “right” actions, poorly studied in the psychological literature (Camacho, 
Higgins, & Luger, 2003). In terms of model testing, the main structure holds in both cultures 
with sound psychometric properties. As expected, each culture presents specificities in terms 
of the relationship among the factors. In the UK, social rules’ association to positive and 
negative rights, and family’s association to negative rights were not found. In the ethics of 
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community, social and family norms are the base of the discourse. The family, as the social 
group closest to the self, is also associated with the autonomy code in Brazil, as well as the 
social rules factor. In general, Brazilians presented moral views that were more balanced 
across moral codes, suggesting that they are not seen as incompatible with each other, while 
the British model shows a stronger division of moral standards.  
 Clearly, more focused research is needed to examine the extent to which these 
associations are specific to Brazilian culture. The greater association among ethics in Brazil 
might imply the existence of cross-justifications (e.g., justifying fidelity to the community 
through religious rules) to a greater extent there than in the UK. Other questions for future 
research have already arisen. Does the use of moral codes change according to the culture the 
group is in? Immigrants and sojourners, for example, have to deal with values and standards 
that are different from their culture of origin and that might affect their moral judgment. 
As a cross-cultural proposal, it is also important to increase the sample of nations, as 
well as studying how moral codes vary within the same country, helping to understand the 
different cultures inside the same nation. When studying other cultures, it is possible to test 
the unique relationship moral dimensions might have, expressing culture-specific features. 
Additionally, we propose the instrument presents potential for detecting not only cultural, but 
also individual differences. 
 The content of morality merits further cross-cultural research, and the development of 
the CADS facilitates such research. This theory-based questionnaire was found to have a clear 
structure, good reliability and validity, and good replicability across two different cultures. 
We hope that this questionnaire will elicit more studies into the content of moral discourse, as 
well as cross-cultural similarities and differences in the way the moral codes are used, thereby 
advancing cross-cultural understanding.  
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Table 1. Associations between the CADS dimensions, religiosity and horizontal-vertical individualism and collectivism in Britain (Study 
1) 
 M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Community 4.43 (.92) -        
2. Autonomy 5.10 (.83) .26** -       
3. Divinity 3.53 (1.13) .43** .04 -      
4. Horizontal Individualism 5.21 (.79) -.08 .17** -.03 -     
5. Vertical Individualism 3.98 (1.00) .11 .01 .07 .19** -    
6. Horizontal Collectivism 5.44 (.71) .47** .30** .22** .01 -.19** -   
7. Vertical Collectivism 4.04 (.96) .50** .09 .40** .01 .11 .31** -  
8. Intrinsic Religiosity 2.13 (.98) .04 -.10 .59** -.09 .03 .01 .32** - 
9. Level of religiosity 2.12 (1.15) .03 -.08 .54** -.12 .03 .03 .23** .82** 





Table 2. Testing the factorial structure of the CADS (Study 2) 
Models df χ2 χ2/d.f. CFI NNFI RMSEA ∆χ2 ∆df ∆CFI 
First order models          
Model 1 – Three factors 1322 3370.51** 2.550 .81 .73 .057 - - - 
Model 2 – Five factors 1316 3149.53** 2.393 .83 .74 .054 220.98** 06 .02 
Model 3 – Six factors 1306 2544.15** 1.948 .90 .79 .046 826.36** 16 .09 
Model 4 – Eight factors 1262 2999.79** 2.377 .84 .76 .052 370.72** 60 .03 
Second order model          
Model 5 – Three 2nd and six 1st order factors 1368 2858.87** 2.090 .90 .78 .048 - - - 
Note: χ2/d.f. = chi-square divided by its degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; NNFI = non-normed fit index; RMSEA = root mean 




Table 3. Cultural Invariance of CADS with Brazilian and British University Students (Study 2) 
Models df χ2 χ2/d.f. CFI NNFI RMSEA ∆χ2 ∆df ∆CFI 
First order models          
Community          
Step 1: Configural 153 467.12** 3.053 .91 .87 .063 - - - 
Step 2: Metric 170 494.45** 2.909 .91 .86 .064 27.33 17 .00 
Step 3: Intercepts (all items) 190 519.69** 2.735 .90 .86 .061 52.67* 37 .01 
Step 4: Family intercepts 175 494.46** 2.825 .91 .86 .062 27.34 22 .00 
Step 5: Partial invariance 186 502.72** 2.703 .91 .86 .061 35.60 33 .00 
Autonomy          
Step 1: Configural 62 99.54** 1.605 .98 .95 .036 - - - 
Step 2: Metric 70 108.23** 1.546 .98 .94 .034 8.69 08 .00 
Step 3: Intercepts (all items) 80 108.27** 1.353 .98 .94 .027 8.73 18 .00 
Divinity          
Step 1: Configural 238 603.93** 2.538 .94 .91 .057 - - - 
Step 2: Metric 251 625.26** 2.491 .94 .90 .057 21.33 13 .00 
Step 3: Intercepts (all items) 270 800. 06** 2.963 .91 .88 .064 196.13** 32 .03 
Step 4: Nature intercepts 256 625.28** 2.442 .94 .90 .056 21.35 18 .00 
Step 5: Partial invariance 269 646.69** 2.404 .94 .90 .055 42.76 31 .00 
Note: χ2/d.f. = chi-square divided by its degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; NNFI = non-normed fit index; RMSEA = root mean 





Table 4. CADS averaged scores and nomological network in the UK and Brazil (Study 2) 
 UNITED KINGDOM BRAZIL 
 Mean HI VI HC VC SB IR Mean HI VI HC VC IR 
Community -.01 -.05 .30** .15 .33** .05 .03 .01 -.06 .06 .19* .28** .11 
Social Rules -.07 -.02 .27** .17* .26** .01 .01 -.03 -.04 .09 .17* .21* .04 
Family .10 -.07 .26** .16* .36** .10 .06 .09 -.08 -.02 .17* .33** .20* 
Autonomy .10 .19* .10 .10 -.05 -.13 -.06 .10 .16* .14 .17* -.03 -.20* 
Positive Rights .11 .20* .07 .08 -.07 -.16* -.07 .22 .16* .18* .08 -.03 -.26** 
Negative Rights .09 .17* .12 .10 -.01 -.08 -.04 -.02 .12 .07 .20* -.03 -.10 
Divinity -.08 -.03 .07 .06 .17* .70** .63** -.01 -.10 -.03 .09 .31** .66** 
Religious Rules -.10 -.04 .06 .04 .17* .73** .65** .10 -.07 -.03 .11 .32** .73** 
Nature -.02 -.01 .08 .11 .12 .32** .06 -.11 -.13 -.01 -.03 .10 .06 
Note: Total averaged scores were calculated based on standardized data; * p < .05, ** p < .01; UK N = 97; BR N = 288; HI = Horizontal 
individualism; VI = Vertical individualism; HC = Horizontal collectivism; VC = Vertical collectivism; SB = Spiritual beliefs; IR = Intrinsic 
religiosity. 
 
